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NOTES AND COMMENTS
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL: IS THERE
STILL A ROLE FOR COMMON LAW?
I. INTRODUCTION
The magnitude of the hazardous waste' disposal problem in our
country is almost incomprehensible. In 1978, there were approximately
30,000 hazardous waste disposal sites in the United States.2 Roughly
thirty-five million metric tons of hazardous waste were being generated
annually, with only ten percent of that waste being disposed of in a
manner considered environmentally safe.3 Assistant U.S. Attorney
General for Land and Natural Resources, James Moorman, in testi-
mony before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
stated,
I believe that [hazardous waste disposal] is probably the first
or second most serious environmental problem in the country.
One of the difficulties is that we really do not know what the
dimensions of the problem are ....
I. "Hazardous waste" has been defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), as amended by Solid Waste Disposal Act
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 [hereinafter cited as RCRA], as:
[A] solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentra-
tion, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environ-
ment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
managed.
Id § 6903(5).
The hazardous substance designation of "such elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and
substances which, when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the pub-
lic health or welfare or the environment," as found in § 9602(a) of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V
1981) [hereinafter cited as CERCLA], has also been taken into account throughout this Comment
whenever the term "hazardous waste" has been used.
2. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 58,946 (1978). Figures were Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) estimates of storage and disposal sites requiring governmental involvement under proposed
regulations to implement the hazardous waste disposal provisions of the RCRA.
3. Id at 58,947.
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We do not know where the millions of tons of stuff is
going....
The public is basically unprotected. There just are not
any lawmen out there, State or Federal, policing this subject.4
Because the hazardous waste problem is often described in stag-
gering statistical terms, it is very difficult to comprehend the immediate
danger of the situation. Therefore, an example of a prevalent method
of handling hazardous wastes, as well as the resultant environmental
and legal problems, helps to bring the subject matter into perspective.
United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc. 5 is an excellent ex-
ample 'of the problems that can be created by inadequate handling of
hazardous waste. Midwest Solvent Recovery, a firm involved in stor-
ing and disposing hazardous wastes, stored thousands of fifty-five gal-
lon drums filled with chemical waste on a dumpsite near a Gary,
Indiana, residential area. In December 1976, a huge fire broke out at
the dumpsite, generating toxic fumes and causing many of the drums to
explode and rocket 250 feet into the air. The fire ravaged the site
throughout the following week. Thereafter, the director of Midwest
Solvent simply relocated his waste storage operation, leaving the previ-
ous site littered with burned out drums and chemical wastes. Less than
one year later, a fire erupted at the new waste site, fueled for days by
the chemicals in thousands of drums.6 By January 1980, when the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought injunctive relief, there
were roughly 14,000 damaged drums stacked or lying on the original
site and thousands of fire-damaged drums on the second site. Poison-
ous chemical wastes had contaminated the topsoil at both sites and a
drainage ditch at the second site leading into the nearby Grand
Calumet River. 7 The EPA's efforts to force a cleanup of the dumpsites
were complicated by the fact that by the time of trial, the government
still was unable to locate or serve process on four of the responsible
parties.J)
Since there are innumerable comparable hazardous waste disposal
4. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., HAZARDOUS WASTE DIsPOsAL 1 (Comm.
Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as HAzARDoUs WASTE DISPOSAL].
5. 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
6. Id at 140-41.
7. Id at 141-42.
8. Id at 139; cf Note, Inactive or Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Coping Wth
a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 1709, 1710-11 (1980) (discussing difficulty in locating appropri-
ate defendants).
1983]
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sites presently in existence,9 it is clear there is a need for developing
methods to control the disposal of hazardous substances and to address
the question of how those injured by improper disposal might be com-
pensated. The federal government is attempting to solve these
problems through legislation.' 0 State legislatures have also enacted
waste disposal statutes. " The purpose of this Comment is to determine
whether common law causes of action are tools that can adequately
resolve technologically-induced environmental problems. The answer
to this inquiry, as outlined in the following pages, is that the common
law alone may indeed be inadequate to handle the nation's hazardous
9. For a discussion of a number of other hazardous waste disposal sites and the resulting
problems, including an overview of the Love Canal catastrophe, see M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE
(1979); Baurer, Love Canal- Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVTL. L, 133,
133-37 (1980).
10. Federal statutes relating to disposal of hazardous substances are discussed in notes 108-20
infra and accompanying text. For further discussion, see Dore, The Standard of Civil Liablityfor
Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260 (1981);
Mott, Liability/or Cleanup of inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 14 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
379 (1982); Comment, The Emergency Powers in the Environmental Protection Statutes: A Sugges-
tionfor a UnbledEmergency Provision, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 298 (1979); Note, supra note 8.
11. The relevant state statutes are as follows: ALA. CODE §§ 22-30-1 to -24 (Supp. 1982);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.010 to .900 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801 to -2806 (Supp.
1975-82); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-4201 to -4224 (Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 25100-25240 (West Supp. 1982); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 30-20-101 to -116 (1973 & Supp. 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-1 15 to -125 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6301-
6317 (Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-701 to -712 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.701 to .73
(West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-2901 to -2921 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 342-
I to -51 (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE §§31-4401 to -4411 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch, 111 ,
§§ 1001-1051 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-1-2 to -19-3 (Bums 1981 &
Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.130 to .141 (West Supp. 1982-83); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65-3401 to -3450 (1980 & Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.005 to .877 (Bobbs-Merrill
1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1131 to :1149.1 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§§ 1301 to 1319-K (Supp. 1982-83); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8.1413 to .1416 (Supp. 1982);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, §§ 1-14, ch. 21D §§ 1-16 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982-83); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.501 to .551 (West Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.01 to .72
(West Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-1 to -135 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 260.350
to .430 (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-101 to -223 (1979); NE. REV. STAT.
§§ 81-1521.01 to .07 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 444.700 to .778 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 147-A:1 to :20 (Supp. 1981); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:IE-1 to -116 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4-1 to -12 (1979); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0900 to -0923, 71-2701 to -
2727 (MeKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-166.16 to .21E (1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 23-29-01 to -12 (1978 & Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.01 to .99 (Baldwin
1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-2001 to -2021 (West Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 459A10 to .690 (1979-80); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6018.101 to .1003 (Purdon Supp. 1982-83);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.1-1 to -23 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-10 to -200 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-6-1 to -50 (1977 & Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 53-6301 to -6317 (Supp. 1982); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 (Vernon Supp.
1982-83); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-14-I to -18 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6601-6613
(Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 32.1-177 to -186 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.105.010
to .140 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-5E-1 to -23 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.60 to .74
(West Supp. 1982-83); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-501 to -503 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
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waste problems; nevertheless, it remains necessary to provide legal re-
course in those areas that statutory law does not satisfactorily address.
II. THE COMMON LAW
Traditionally, the public has looked to the judiciary to settle dis-
putes and redress injuries. With advances in technology enabling the
production of countless varieties of chemicals,' 2 a large portion of the
responsibility for policing the disposal of chemicals and other hazard-
ous wastes has fallen on government regulatory agencies, in particular
the EPA. Nevertheless, the judiciary still plays a vital role in adjudicat-
ing administrative actions and in resolving complaints of private citi-
zens or local groups. Traditionally, the law of torts has been the
primary common law approach to environmental issues. It has become
increasingly apparent, however, that the common law of torts is
strapped by the demands of adapting to societal and environmental
problems that may be beyond its ability to resolve.' 3
!_The cornerstone of common law tort actions is the concept of
fault;14 remedies are not permissible unless a causal link can be estab-
lished between the defendant's act and the plaintifi's injury.7 1 Given
12. In 1980, there were 43,000 chemical substances in commercial production in the U.S.,
with thousands of new ones being introduced every year. Growth of the chemical industry has
continued to accelerate from year to year. The industry is economically booming, with worldwide
chemical sales of the top fifty producers reaching approximately $90 billion in 1979. Chemical
spills harmful to the environment occur roughly 3,500 times annually. In 1979, over 2,000 dump-
sites were targeted by the EPA as posing threats to public health. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1980). For an excellent overview of the problems New Jersey is facing from the expansion
of the chemical industry, see Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Rem ediesfor Haz-
ardous Waste Injuries, 12 RuT. L.J. 117, 118-22 (1980).
13. Under the common law approach, the court must require plaintiff to show that defendant
has not only been polluting, but that such activity has had a harmful effect upon plaintiff. See,
e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 8 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 20,503, 20,505 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 6, 1978) (plaintiffs showing of substantial risk of infection from inadequately treated sewage
discharges into water source held sufficient to warrant relief), a fdinpart, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.
1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 982 (1980); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514
F.2d 492, 536-37 (8th Cir. 1975) (evidence insufficient to justify immediate closing of defendant's
plant discharging taconite tailings into Lake Superior); Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498
F.2d 1073, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1974) (plaintiffs failed to prove demonstrable public health hazard
created by defendant's activities); Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 288, 168 N.E.2d
811, 817, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 137, mod#Fed, 8 N.Y.2d 1025, 170 N.E.2d 214, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1960) (widow of cancer victim unable to prove occupational exposure to benzene was cause of
death).
14. For a discussion of the role "fault" played in the development of the tort branch of com-
mon law, see G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 12-19 (1980).
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236-39 (4th ed. 1971). For
further discussion, see Epstein, 4 Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEoAL STuD. 151 (1973); Com-
ment, Environmental Carcinogenesis: Regulation on the Frontiers of Science, 7 ENvTL L. 83, 94-97
(1976).
1983]
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this fundamental common law requirement, the difficulties of applying
specific tort law causes of action in environmental pollution cases are
apparent.
A. Common Law Nuisance
The most frequently used common law tort action in an environ-
mental lawsuit is that of nuisance. 6 Both "private" and "public" nui-
sance actions, discussed below, have been utilized to seek monetary
damages for injuries already incurred and to seek injunctions to pre-
vent continuation of the harmful activity or situation.
1. Private Nuisance Action
(The private nuisance cause of action is tied directly to the use and
enjoyment of land'7 and is generally an action brought by an individ-
ual or group of private citizens.' Since private nuisance is a non-
trespassory invasion of an owner's use and enjoyment of his land, 9
16. For a discussion of nuisance causes of action, see W. PROSSER, supra note 15, §§ 88-89, at
583-602.
17. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977) specifies that,
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is alegalcause
of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the
invasion is either
(a) intentional or unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for
negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.
Id (emphasis added).
18. "For a private nuisance there is liability only to those who have property rights and
privileges in respect to the use and enjoyment of the land affected. . . ." Id § 821E. For exam-
ples of the application of the private nuisance action, see Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Lafferty,
174 F.2d 848, 854 (6th Cir. 1949) (nuisance found when power plant caused violent quaking of
earth and shaking and trembling of plaintiffs' houses, resulting in diminution of value of use and
enjoyment of residences); Gesswin v. Beckwith, 35 Conn. Supp. 89, 89, 397 A.2d 121, 121 (1978)
(private nuisance includes all injuries to owner or occupier of property in enjoyment of that prop-
erty, including fall from defectively constructed treehouse placed on property by landlord); Mul-
cahey v. IT&T, 31 Conn. Supp. 1, 2, 318 A.2d 804, 805 (1974) (customer in public parking garage
does not have interest in land sufficient to sustain private nuisance claim); Richmond Bros. v.
Hagemann, 359 Mass. 265, -, 268 N.E.2d 680, 682 (1971) (erecting structures on land adjacent to
radio station transmitting towers did not constitute private nuisance since no actual emission from
the structures invaded station's use and enjoyment of its land).
19. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977); see, e.g., Davoust v. Mitchell, 146
Ind. App. 536, -, 257 N.E.2d 332, 336 (1970) ("Anything offensive to the senses so as to essen-
tially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property is a nuisance," including a
neighbor's odorous, unsightly, and noisy dogpen.); Schmidt v. Paul, 554 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (mud and debris that washed onto property from adjacent construction site which
neighbor refused to remove constituted a nuisance); Bowlin v. George, 239 S.C. 429, -, 123
S.E.2d 528, 531 (1962) (residence owner allowed to maintain private nuisance action against adja-
cent auto junkyard where stagnant water collecting in wrecked autos created breeding place for
mosquitoes).
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many types of invasion could be actionable under this theory. For ex-
ample, a private nuisance action appears readily applicable in situa-
tions involving seepage of chemicals into groundwater from nearby
chemical dumps, toxic fumes escaping from leaking barrels on adjoin-
ing property, or pollutants discharged into the air by smokestacks of a
nearby factory.
Despite the promise that the private nuisance cause of action ap-
pears to give a potential plaintiff, problems arise because nuisance lia-
bility requires proof of significant harm.20 The proof of the connection
between the resulting injuries and the defendant's previous acts often is
very difficult to obtain. Many of the effects of hazardous waste disposal
are not manifested for many years.2" Chemicals carelessly dumped
that have seeped down through the soil and into the groundwater may
take years to contaminate the drinking water or the soil of nearby prop-
22erty owners. Thus, it may not become obvious for a long period of
time that ailments within a family could be the result of polluted drink-
ing water from private wells on the property.23 When such a possibility
does occur to the family or is suggested by the treating physician, proof
of the actual cause of the illness may be impossible or too costly to
20. See, e.g., Stockdale v. Agrico Chem. Co., 340 F. Supp. 244,262 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (farmer
not entitled to recover damages under nuisance theory for livestock loss attributed to emissions
from chemical plant because he failed to prove proximate cause or actionable damage); Jones v.
Adler, 183 Ala. 435, -, 62 So. 777, 780 (1913) (to constitute nuisance, sewage purification plant
must cause annoyance or discomfort of "such degree or extent as to materially interfere with the
ordinary comfort of home existence"); Jilison v. Barton, 139 Ga. App. 767,-, 229 S.E.2d 476,478
(1975) ("unsightliness of adjacent property alone.. . is not such inconvenience as to amount to a
nuisance," nor is mere violation of an ordinance a private nuisance). "There is liability for a
nuisance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered by a
normal person in the community or by property in normal condition and used for a normal pur-
pose." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1977).
21. Toxic teratogenic, mutagenic, and carcinogenic agents can remain dormant in both
body and environment for years. In the body, low levels can accumulate over long
periods until the threshold level is reached and an injury occurs. In addition, the person
exposed to the chemicals may not manifest any symptoms, but the toxics can be trans-
ferred to future generations as mutations and birth defects.
Comment, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims: RCR4 Insurance Regulations and a Not So
"Super"fundAct, 11 ENVTL. L. 689, 713 n.130 (1981) (citing CommentA Proposalfor the Admin-
istrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollutioin 4 Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON
LEis. 683, 686 (1977)).
22. It may take as many as 10 to 20 years for contaminants to reach a wellfield only 3,400 feet
away, depending upon the gradient, the subsurface formation, and the amount of pumping from
wells in the area. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1063-65 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d
204 (3d Cir. 1982). For a list of studies regarding the movement of contaminants through soil and
within the aquifer, see D. TODD & D. MCNULTY, POLLUTED GROUNDWATER 100-04 (1976); Note,
supra note 12, at 13941.
23. See, eg., HAzARDous WASTE DIsposAL, supra note 4, at 17; M. BROWN, supra note 9, at
186-88.
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pursue.' In order to obtain proof of causation, the plaintiff often must
rely on the aid of governmental agencies which, typically, are-
overburdened with requests for help and sometimes unsympathetic to
the individual's problem. 25 Even when soil and water tests indicate
that dangerous levels of toxics are present, the problem of proof re-
mains. The plaintiff still must demonstrate that those toxics are the
actual cause of the injury. The problem of proof is further com-
pounded when the injury could have resulted from one of several
causes. Moreover, the plaintiff's burden of proof is exacerbated by the
paucity of scientific knowledge of the effects caused by many modem
chemicals and cheinical byproducts. 2 6 Clearly, in matters involving the
boundaries of scientific knowledge, any common law cause of action
presents serious problems of proof for the plaintiff
i additional obstruction in private nuisance actions is the "bal-
ancing" which the court may apply in arriving at a decision. Even if
the plaintiff is able to prove the defendant's activities have caused his
injuries, he may find the court unwilling to grant a remedy because the
economic harm that the defendant, and perhaps the community, would
suffer from an enforced cessation of the activities would be too great to
jusfify the abatement of the private harm. In such a case, the court may
either refuse the plaintiff the remedy he seeks or simply award him
monetary damages in lieu of protection from future nuisane) The
Boomer v. Allantic Cement Co. 28 decision provides an excellent exam-
ple of the New York Court of Appeals' application of this eco-
nomic/social balancing approach. The court determined that the
gravity of the harm suffered by private landowners from the dirt,
smoke, and vibration caused by defendant's cement plant did not jus-
tify the severe economic consequences that a permanent closing of the
plant would inflict upon the company and the community. As an alter-
native to injunction, the court awarded the plaintiffs permanent mone-
tary damages and allowed the defendant to continue its operations
24. Note, supra note 12, at 139-43.
25. See, eg., HAzARDous WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 4, at 20-22; M. BROWN, sUpra note 9,
at 121-31.
26. See Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 284, 168 N.E.2d 811, 814-15, 204
N.Y.S.2d 129, 134, mod#led, 8 N.Y.2d 1025, 170 N.E.2d 214, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1960) ("[T]here
must be some evidence of a basis for the opinion, and the acceptance in one case of the 'possible'
as meaning reasonable medical certainty does not justify treating every 'possibility' as though it
were enough to establish the facts sought to be proved.").
27. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 537 (8th Cir. 1975); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827-831 (1977).
28. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
[Vol. 18:448
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unchanged.2 9 To a plaintiff seeking relief from a noxious interference
with the use and enjoyment of his land, such a holding could be consid-
ered less than a victory.
2. Public Nuisance Action
(I contrast with the private nuisance action, a public nuisance
cause of action is not dependent upon ownership of property. Instead,
it involves an unreasonable interference with a right "common to the
general public."30 If an individual can show that he has suffered physi-
cal injury or pecuniary loss due to a nuisance created by the defendant,
he then has a valid claim for damages.3"
This tort action would be useful in a situation in which a particular
area of a city was suffering noxious fumes from a waste disposal site
used by a private organization) For example, in McCastle v. Rollins
Environmental Services,3" the plaintiffs brought an action in state court
on behalf of themselves and 4,000 other residents of an area located
adjacent to a privately-owned hazardous waste disposal facility which
contained incinerators, ponds, and dumping pits. The plaintiffs alleged
29. Id at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319. When an action constitutes a perma-
nent nuisance, complainants may be awarded all damages already sustained, or those which may
thereafter be sustained, in one action. "Where the cause of the injury is in its nature permanent,
and a recovery for such injury would confer a license on the defendants to continue the cause, the
entire damage may be recovered in a single action . Severt v. Beckley Coals, Inc., 153 W.
Va. 600, -, 170 S.E.2d 577, 582-83 (1969).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977); see, e.g., Fort Smith v. Western Hide
& Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, -, 239 S.W. 724, 726 (1922) (business of buying and selling hides held
public nuisance because odors and flies adversely affected health and comfort of others in vicin-
ity); Liber v. Flor, 160 Colo. 7,-, 415 P.2d 332, 338 (1966) (storage of boxes of dynamite only 50-
70 feet from paved highway endangered public's right to safety and constituted public nuisance);
State v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254, -, 169 S.W. 267, 273 (1914) (maintenance of
powder factory and storage facility near public roads and schoolhouse affected the rights of citi-
zens to safety and constituted a public nuisance).
If the goal of the suit is to enjoin the nuisance, under the Restatement approach the individ-
ual must prove he has a right to recover damages under § 821C(1) or prove he has the authority to
bring a suit on behalf of the public, or prove standing to sue in a citizen's action or class action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(2) (1977); see, e.g., Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiber-
glass Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 131, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 360 (1971). Although the individual
plaintiffs' pleaded facts were sufficient to support a public nuisance action in regard to plant emis-
sions, plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. The action was held to be properly left to an ap-
pointed representative of the community. Id at 123, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C comments d & h (1977). "[l]t is uniformly
held that a private individual has no action for the invasion of the purely public right, unless his
damage is in some way to be distinguished from that sustained by other members of the general
public." W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 88, at 586. "Where the plaintiff suffers personal injury, or
harm to his health, . . . there is no difficulty in finding a different kind of damage." Id at 588.
"Pecuniary loss to the plaintiff has been regarded as different in kind . Id at 590.
32. 514 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. La. 1981).
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that the fumes from the defendant's plant caused them to suffer physi-
cal 'ailments such as upset stomachs, sore throats, and burning eyes.33
Defendant removed the suit to federal court, which extended the state
court's temporary restraining order on further disposal activities. The
federal court then granted plaintiffs' motion to remand the action to the
state court on the basis that federal law was not applicable and Con-
gress did not intend to supersede state law in actions between private
parties.34 The Louisiana Court of Appeal" affirmed the injunction on
further disposal and amended it to enjoin further emission of odors and
fumes that cause "serious or material discomfort to persons of ordinary
sensibilities in a normal state of health."36
In another use of the public nuisance cause of action, the City of
Philadelphia sued Stepan Chemical Co.37 to recover cleanup costs and
consequential damages resulting from the illegal dumping of industrial
waste on city property. In addition to stating a common law cause of
action, the city also predicated the suit upon several federal and state
environmental statutes.38  The court dismissed five of the claims but
permitted the city to pursue its claim for response costs under the aegis
of common law theories.39 The significance of the court's recognition
that a valid cause of action existed under common law cannot be over-
stated, for the issue which this case represents, the recovery of costs of
cleaning up dumpsites and decontaminating polluted water sources, 40
may prove to be of vital importance to many communities in the de-
cades to come. If the high costs involved in such cleanups cannot be
recovered from the parties causing the damage through an appropriate
33. Id at 938.
34. Id at 941.
35. 415 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
36. Id at 519.
37. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
38. Id at 1139-40.
39. The claims for reliefthat were dismissed by the court included: The citizen suit provision
of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976); the federal common law of nuisance; the
Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.101 (Purdon Supp.
1982-83); the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Purdon Supp.
1982-83); various provisions of the Philadelphia Code. The court allowed the city to pursue its
claims under the common law theories of nuisance, trespass, strict liability, and negligence. A
claim under CERCLA was also permitted. 544 F. Supp. at 1154.
40. In Stepan, defendant generators of industrial byproduct wastes had contracted with pri-
vate haulers to dispose of the waste. The haulers bribed two city employees to allow dumping at a
city landfill. This illegal dumping resulted in soil contamination as well as contamination of un-
derlying groundwater and the adjacent Delaware River. The City was forced to undertake a
cleanup program estimated to cost $10 million and to suffer a $20 million delay in construction of
a sewage sludge recycling center on the site. 544 F. Supp. at 1139.
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judicial proceeding or financed by a governmental fund established for
such a purpose,41 then many cities may find themselves facing the un-
pleasant alternative of either polluted natural resources or financial
ruin.
Often there are circumstances that lend themselves to liability suits
under both private and public nuisance actions. Chappell v. SCA Serv-
ices42 presents a fact situation in which this combination of nuisance
actions is appropriate. In Chappell, representatives of residents of the
Village of Wilsonville and adjoining landowners brought a class action
against the operator of a hazardous chemical waste landfill containing
polychlqrinated byphenyls (PCBs) and other toxic waste substances.43
In a previous trial,44 the defendant was enjoined from further opera-
tions at the landfill and ordered to clean up the site.45 The second suit
sought damages for "actual interference with the enjoyment of [plain-
tiffs'] real property, including past and future damages to their crops,
residences and underground water supplies, and for the substantial
diminution in property value."46 In addition, the plaintiffs claimed
personal injuries including "burning eyes, running noses, headaches,
nausea and exposure to carcinogenic elements." 47 The federal district
court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to the county circuit
court, concluding that the federal court had neither diversity nor fed-
eral question jurisdiction and that "it would appear that a state com-
mon law nuisance action may be the only way plaintiffs can recover for
any damages which have accrued to them. '48 Thus, when the plaintiff
can prove special damages and causation, the public nuisance action,
41. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. V 1981). Congress passed CERCLA in 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981), to complement existing environmental pollution statutes
through cleanup compensation. Superflnd at Square One" Promising Statutory Framework Re-
quires Forceful EPA Implementation, 11 EiqvTL. L. RFp. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 10,101, 10,102 (May
1981). The Act established a $1.6 billion fund to reimburse costs of cleanup, removal, and re-
source restoration where hazardous waste polluters are unknown or are unable or unwilling to be
financially responsible. Id Generally, expenditures for each individual response action are lim-
ited to $1 million. Id at 10,103.
42. 540 F. Supp. 1087 (C.D. MI1. 1982).
43. Id at 1089.
44. Village ofWilsonville v. SCA Servs., 77 Dl. App. 3d 618, 396 N.E.2d 552 (1979), affd, 86
I11. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981). For a discussion ofthe background of this case, see J. BELFIoLO,
T. LIPPE & S. FRANKLIN, HAzARDous WASTE DisPosAL SITEs 125-36 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
J. BELFIOLIO].
45. Wilsonville, 77 Il App. 3d at -, 396 N.E.2d at 566.
46. Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1089.
47. Id
48. Id at 1100.
19831
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss3/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
often coupled with a private nuisance claim, may present the plaintiff
with the only viable means of recovering damages.
B. Trespass
The tort of trespass involves an intentional physical invasion of
property.49 If a plaintiff can establish that his present possessory inter-
est in his land has been invaded, resulting in damage to himself, his
family, or his property, he can hold the defendant liable for that
damage.50
(There are obvious limitations in the use of common law trespass
when applied in the environmental hazardous waste suit. One such
limitation occurs since the action canfiot be brought unless a physical
invasion of plaintiffs property has caused damage, yet proof of a physi-
cal invasion can pose a serious obstacle to recovery when the activity
that results in harm occurs off plaintiff's property.5' For example, im-
proper dumping of chemical wastes may not physically invade plain-
tiff's property, but may cause contaminated groundwater5 2 or toxic
fumes which can substantially affect plaintiffs propertyjThese types of
injuries are more readily proved in common law nuisance actions.53
One circumstance in which common law trespass could be an im-
portant tool of the hazardous waste litigant is exemplified in City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co. 54 In that case, private waste haul-
ers obtained entrance to city property illegally in order to dispose of
hazardous chemicals. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiffs
49. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 530 (Ala. 1979) ("[If, as a result of the
defendant's [lead smelting] operation, the polluting substance is deposited upon the plaintiff's
property, thus interfering with his exclusive possessory interest by causing substantial damage to
the res, then the plaintiff may seek his remedy in trespass. ... ); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 158 & comment i (1964); cf Born v. Exxon Corp., 388 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala. 1980)
(light and odor emanating from oil treating facility did not constitute trespass since no particulate
matter was deposited on plaintiffs property).
50. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 13, at 63-67.
51. But of Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 173 (D. Or. 1963) (emissions
of flourine and flourides from aluminum plant which settled on plaintiff's land, damaging peach
and apricot tree, constituted a continuing trespass).
52. HAzARDous WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 4, at 13 ("The most pervasive damage done to
the environment at these sites has been the contamination of groundwater.").
53. For example, although the court in Renken held that a trespass had occurred, it indicated
in the opinion that such a continuing trespass could be viewed as a nuisance and that indeed a
continuing trespass could well be a nuisance. 226 F. Supp. at 175-76; see also Hakkila v, Old
Colony Broken Stone & Concrete Co., 264 Mass. 447, -, 162 N.E. 895, 896 (1928). Blasting
operations caused throwing of stones upon plaintiffs' property. "The throwing of stones upon
lands of others.., is a direct trespass, and when in the nature of a continued wrong is a private
nuisance." Id
54. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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had stated a valid trespass claim."
U:Afortunately, the costs of effective toxic waste disposal are high56
and the industrial manufacturer concerned with profit margin may ask
few questions regarding the ultimate destination of the wastes hauled
off by an independent contractorDTAlternatively, the generator of the
waste may simply discard his wastes improperly on his own property.58
In either situation, a litigant cannot effectively recover under a trespass
action, for in the first instance he often cannot identify the source of the
contaminants he finds on his property, and in the second instance, no
actual invasion of his property has occurred.
C. Negligence
he elements of a negligence cause of action specifically enumer-
ate the obstacles to be overcome in effectively litigating a hazardous
waste lawsuit. The plaintiff must prove that: (1) a legally recognized
duty required the defendant to conform his conduct to a certain stan-
dard of care; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) the conduct that
constituted the breach of duty was the proximate cause of (4) actual
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. "With the cost of using adequate treatment methods estimated at as much as ten to forty
times that of environmentally offensive alternatives, continuous pressure is necessary to deter op-
erators from realizing the substantial economic benefits of improper disposal." Note, supra note
12, at 130 (footnotes omitted). "The scarcity of [safe disposal] sites is posing a major immediate
problem in many States. . . . Besides the fact that the number of State sites is clearly inadequate
to handle the hazardous waste now being generated, the transportation costs to these few sites are
often prohibitive." HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 4, at 27.
Compliance with environmental statutes will noticeably affect the profit margin of the chemi-
cal industry. "[The cost to industry to comply with the proposed regulations under the...
RCRA (enacted in 1976 to provide adequate regulation of solid and hazardous wastes) will be in
the neighborhood of $750 to $900 million per year." SENATE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF Gov-
ERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2 D SESS.,
REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOURCE
CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT 2 (Comm. Print 1980). Thus, only if the chemical industry
can be forced to bear a substantial share of the $26.2 to $44.1 billion cost of cleaning up current
hazardous disposal sites, id at 1, will statutory compliance become economically attractive.
57. In 1978, the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee began an extensive investigation into hazardous waste disposal.
Findings showed that of 1,605 chemical plants providing information, 78% used company haulers
or outside contractors to remove process wastes from facility property, and 37% of these compa-
nies indicated they were unaware of the disposal site locations of the waste hauled from their
plants since 19.50. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SaSS., WASTE DISPOSAL SITE SURVEY
24-25 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as WASTE DISPOSAL SITE SURVEY]. "[W]aste has
been illegally dumped in open fields, swamps, and vacant lots. It also has been spread on roads as
a dangerous ingredient of road oil. In sum. . . proper disposal of hazardous materials is the
exception, rather than the rule." HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 4, at 2.
58. HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 4, at 3-4, 25-26; WASTE DISPOSAL SITE SUR-
VEY, supra note 57, at 24.
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harm resulting to plaintiff.5 9
Flhe most difficult problems of proof in a negligence claim are the
determination of the standard of care owed by the generator/disposer
of hazardous wastes and the "foreseeability of the harm" component of
proximate cause.6 The industry standard regarding disposal of haz-
ardous wastes is nebulous at best.6 Too little has been and is known
about the effects of chemical wastes being discarded throughout the na-
tion,62 and there are doubts that a truly safe means of disposal is even
possible for some of the byproducts being generated today.63 Thus, the
courts face the unpleasant task of determining the adherence to a stan-
dard of care in the hazardous waste lawsuit that may well be beyond
the court's expertise, and indeed even the industry's knowledge, to de-
59. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 30, at 143-44.
60. Powder Horn Nursery v. Soil & Plant Lab., 119 Ariz. 78, 579 P.2d 582 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978), illustrates the difficulty of establishing the standard of care against which a defendant's
actions will be measured in determining negligence. In PowderHorn, a commercial plant nursery
brought a negligence action against a soil and plant laboratory for failing to inform the nursery of
proper methods of combating iron toxicity. Plaintiff alleged that such failure resulted in plant
loss. The court noted that the plaintiffnursery had a burden to establish both the standard of care
required of the defendant and the defendant's departure from that standard. Id at -, 579 P.2d at
586. Plaintiff's failure to meet its burden of proof resulted in summary judgment for defendant.
Id at -, 579 P.2d at 587.
61. [Wlaste disposal practices vary considerably among participating companies de-
pending upon size, types of waste generated, geographic location of facilities, and corpo-
rate policy. Just as no one chemical plant exactly represents the waste handling practices
of its parent company, so no one corporation represents the chemical industry as a
whole ....
And second, just as waste disposal practices vary by company, they vary also by
region of the country and by state. Climate, density of population, and state environ-
mental and land use laws are significant factors influencing waste handling practices
across the country.
WASTE DISPOSAL SITE SURVEY, supra note 57, at 14.
62. See, ag., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1062-63 (D.N.J. 1981), aJ'd, 688 F,2d
204 (3d Cir. 1982) (court listed several chemical compounds "suspected" of being carcinogenic or
teratogenic); Comment, supra note 15, at 94-95. For a discussion of characteristics used by the
EPA to identify a hazardous waste, see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 12TH ANNUAL
REPORT 95 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY].
63. Many hazardous wastes placed in land disposal facilities will not degrade to a point
where they are no longer hazardous, or will do so only very slowly. Toxic heavy metals,
for example, will not degrade. . . . Moreover, current scientific knowledge about the
degradation of hazardous wastes placed in land disposal facilities is imperfect....
There is good theoretical and empirical evidence that the hazardous constituents
which are placed in land disposal facilities very like!y will migrate from the facility into
the broader environment .... (Elven with the application of best available land dispo-
sal technology, it will occur eventually.
Although it is technically possible to design and construct a land disposal contain-
ment system. . . to interrupt this process; EPA seriously questioned whether such sys-
tems can be maintained and made to operate effectively and efficiently for long periods
of time, or perpetually where this is required.
46 Fed. Reg. 11,125, 11,128 (1981). But see ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 62, at 101-09
(summary of effective alternatives in handling of hazardous wastes).
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termine.64 Moreover, since many of the acts causing harmful results
today occurred years ago,65 the courts may have to consider whether a
contemporary standard of care is even relevant in assessing any negli-
gence involved in previous methods of waste handling and disposal._6
In light of the fact that past standards of care may have been less
stringent, and given that competent knowledge of long-range chemical
effects on people and the environment may have been unavailable, the
foreseeability of harm necessary to prove the proximate cause element
of negligence is problematical. Negligence "necessarily involves a fore-
seeable risk, a threatened danger of injury, and conduct unreasonable
in proportion to the danger."67  Methods of disposal of hazardous
chemicals which would be blatantly negligent today might not lead to
liabilit if the harm which resulted was not foreseeable at the time of
the act.j In addition, to prove causation of harm from chemical pollu-
tants, a.plidntiff must isolate the responsible chemical, trace the path-
way from the site where the chemical entered the environment to where
it came into contact with the plaintiff, and then prove medically that
the chemical..caused his injury-a task of frequently insurmountableproportions.68,inally, the practice of contracting out the actual dispo-
sal69 may give many generators of hazardous wastes the legal "out" of
disclaiming liability for, or even knowledge of, negligent practices
7
64. For a discussion of the determination of a standard of care in the hazardous waste field,
see Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to Control
Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1121-23 (1970), which indicates that formulating an industry
standard involves technological, political, and philosophical considerations.
65. "Problems from dumping which probably took place over 50 years ago are now becom-
ing evident in the City of Denver, Colorado. Radioactive waste products from old radium indus-
try mining and milling operations have been discovered in buildings, under buildings, in
abandoned lots and under streets throughout the Denver area." HAzAR)Ous WASTE DISPOSAL,
supra note 4, at 12. "In Minnesota, 11 cases of arsenic poisoning, which developed as a result of
drinking contaminated well water, were traced to the burial of grasshopper bait approximately 35
years previously." Note, supra note 12, at 124 n.46 (citing U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, HAzARDous WASTE DISPOSAL DAMAGE REPORTS No. 1, at 1 (1975)).
66. The defendant can argue that when the wastes were disposed of, perhaps thirty years
prior to litigation, the risks were unknown and the disposal practices used were the in-
dustry's standard .... The fact that it became known later that the disposal technique
could result in harm is immaterial. The defendant is liable only if he continues disposal
after the time the risk of harm should have been recognized.
Comment, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims: RCA Insurance Regulations and a Not So
"Super"fund Act, 11 ENVrL. L. 689, 713-14 (1981).
67. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 43, at 250.
68. See Comment, A Proposalfor the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Sub-
stance Pollution: A ModelAct, 14 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 683, 706 (1977).
69. See supra notes 40 & 57.
70. See, e.g., Merten v. Pedersen, 199 Neb. 34, -, 255 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1977) ("[O]ne who
causes work to be done is not liable for injuries that result.., from carelessness in the perform-
ance of the work by the employees of an independent contractor to whom he has left the work
14
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While the negligence cause of action does not appear exceptionally
promising as a method of compensating victims of hazardous chemi-
cals, there are some cases in which negligence theories have proved
successful. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide,7' plaintiffs brought a
negligence suit to recover for poisoning caused by flourides emanating
from defendant's aluminum reduction plant. The court held that there
was proof of the poisoning, that flourides emanating from the plant
were shown to have caused the poisoning, that flourides emitted in suf-
ficient quantity to cause poisoning would be an excessive emission, and
that such excess was circumstantial evidence of negligence.72 Hagy v.
Allied Chemical& Dye Corp. 73 is another case where a negligence cause
of action was successful. In Hagy, a jury found that a woman's dor-
mant cancer was aggravated by driving through sulphuric acid smog
emitted by a manufacturer during a cold air inversion.74 The manufac-
turer was held negligent for not stopping operations sooner, as a rea-
sonably prudent operator would during an inversion.7  Finally, in a
promising Louisiana decision, Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana,
Inc. ,76 landowners of a tract adjacent to land on which a corporation
was conducting industrial waste disposal operations were successful in
proving the corporation's negligence in allowing the toxic wastes to
leak onto their property.77 In light of the fact that such actions have
proved successful, the common law negligence action cannot be totally
discounted as a viable tool in the hazardous waste lawsuit.
D. Federal Common Law of Nuisance
When the Supreme Court first applied the federal common law of
nuisance to abate pollution in Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee /),7 it
without reserving to himself any control over the execution of it."); Ventoza v. Anderson, 14
Wash. App. 882, -, 545 P.2d 1219, 1228-29 (1976) (jury was properly instructed that one who
engages an independent contractor is not liable for the trespass of that contractor unless the tres-
pass occurred with the direction or knowledge of the principal). But see Boroughs v. Joiner, 337
So. 2d 340, 343 (Ala. 1976) (landowner could not escape liability for damages caused by aerial
application of insecticides by independent contractor since such activity falls into the "inherently
dangerous" category); Bousquet v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 824,-, 372 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1978)
(defendant held responsible for damages from oil seepage despite its claim that seepage was result
of negligence of independent contractor).
71. 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
72. Id at 330.
73. 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1953).
74. Id at-, 265 P.2d at 91.
75. Id at -, 265 P.2d at 88.
76. 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 575-76 (La. 1979).
77. Id at 606.
78. 406 U.S. 91 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Milwaukee l].
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appeared that a new weapon against hazardous waste generators had
been added to a plaintiff's arsenal. Quoting Texas v. Pankey79 that "the
ecological rights of a State. . .should. . . be held to be a matter hav-
ing basis and standard in federal common law,"' 0 the Court concluded
that although new federal laws could be written that would preempt the
federal common law of nuisance, "until that comes to pass, federal
courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging
creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.""1 At the time the
Supreme Court heard the case in 1972, there was no comprehensive
statutory method regulating pollution of interstate waters.8 2
As a result of the Court's Milwaukee I decision, many cases were
filed in federal courts on federal common law nuisance grounds.8 3 Re-
sults, however, were often inconsistent, depending upon the circuit in
which the case originated or the types of remedies sought.8 4 In Reserve
Mining Co. v. EPA,85 the Eighth Circuit rejected the federal common
law of nuisance as a basis for relief and stated that "federal nuisance
law contemplates, at a minimum, interstate pollution of air or water." 86
The court followed this theory in Townshi of Long Beach v. City of
New York8 7 when it allowed federal common law nuisance claims even
though the plaintiff was a township, rather than a state, because the
dumping of garbage and sludge into the Hudson River created a dis-
pute of interstate nature. 88
In Parsell v. Shell Oil Co. ,89 the Connecticut District Court held
that a showing of interstate effects was necessary to sustain a claim
under the federal common law of nuisance. Futhermore, the court in-
79. 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971).
80. 406 U.S. at 99-100.
81. Id at 107.
82. For a discussion of the Milwaukee I decision and the status of environmental protection
statutes in 1972, see Fort, The Necessary Demise of Federal Common Law Nuisance, 12 Loy. U.
Cmi. LJ. 131, 132-36, 144 (1981).
83. Id at 140-44; Mott, supra note 10, at 398-401; Note, Federal Common Law and Water
Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preservation, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 500, 501-02 nn.8-9 (1981).
84. See Fort, supra note 82, at 140-42. The Seventh Circuit expanded the scope of authority
under federal nuisance law to equate with that of the commerce power exercised by Congress and
thus allowed federal nuisance suits for purely intrastate waters. Id at 141. The First, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits required interstate effects to be shown before allowing federal common law nui-
sance claims, while the Second Circuit has issued summary affirmances on both sides of the extra-
territorial issue. Id at 142. Finally, the Third Circuit applied federal common law in intrastate
waters apparently because of a need for a uniform rule of decision. Id at 143.
85. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
86. Id at 520.
87. 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 (D.N.J. 1978).
88. Id
89. 421 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1976).
1983]
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dicated that Milwaukee I was distinguishable because the plaintiff there
was a governmental entity9" and the claim was for equitable relief, not
for damages as in Parsell.91 Just four years later, however, the Con-
necticut court expanded its interpretation of the scope of federal com-
mon law nuisance to allow an actionable claim without a showing of
interstate effects.92 Following the Seventh Circuit's lead, the court
abandoned its prior interstate requirement.93 The holding even went so
far as to state that the imminent hazard provision of the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA)94 was to be governed by the fed-
eral common law of nuisance, and that a federal nuisance action was
not "impermissibly retroactive" in application to acts preceding the en-
actment of the RCRA.95
CThe promising possibilities for applying federal common law to
the problems of hazardous waste disposal were severely limited, if not
completely eliminated, by the Supreme Court in the second Milwaukee
case (Milwaukee I 9 Between the 1972 Milwaukee I decision and
1981, when Milwaukee II was decided, Congress enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 97 In deciding
whether Illinois could maintain a federal common law nuisance action
against the City of Milwaukee and its Sewage Commission for pollut-
ing Lake Michigan with inadequately treated sewage, the Court re-
peated the rationale it used in Milwaukee I.
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regula-
tions may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of
nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be
empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging crea-
90. Indicating that the federal nuisance cause of action had been extended by several courts
to governmental entities other than the states, the court refused to extend the right of action to a
private plaintiff in the absence of interstate impact. Id at 1281.
91. Citing Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), as
support, the court limited any right of action that private parties might have under Milwaukee I to
injunctive relief. The awarding of damages would contribute to the "resolution of intricate and
highly important questions of the appropriate water quality standards... only in the most adhoc
way." 421 F. Supp. at 1281-82 (emphasis in original).
92. United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1139 (D. Conn. 1980).
93. The court quoted Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1980).
[Tihere is an overriding federal interest in preserving, free of pollution, our interstate
and navigable waters. When apollution controversy arises, it is immaterial whether there is
a showing ofextraterritorialpollution effects. The issue is whether the dispute is a matter
of federal concern. When it is, as in this case, federal courts should be accessible.
496 F. Supp. at 1135 (emphasis in original).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. V 1981).
95. 496 F. Supp. at 1129.
96. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Milwaukee I].
97. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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tion of a public nuisance by water pollution."
After reviewing the scope of the amendments, the Court stated that
"[t]he establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program
by Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee
was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to at-
tempt to improve on that program with federal common law."99 Ac-
cordingly, the Court disallowed any federal common law remedy.
The ramifications of Milwaukee II quickly prevented plaintiffs in
federal courts from bringing environmental lawsuits under federal
common law. The previously receptive Seventh Circuit' ° partially re-
versed its holding in Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp. 101 and denied
Illinois any federal common law remedy for pollution of Lake Michi-
gan by the defendant manufacturer on the basis of Milwaukee 11. l"2
The New Jersey District Court ruled in United States v. Kin-Buc,
Inc. 103 that the Clean Air Act' °4 preempted the federal common law of
nuisance in cases of air pollution emanating from a hazardous waste
disposal site. After applying the Milwaukee II approach of determin-
ing whether the scope of the legislative scheme addressed the problem
formerly governed by federal common law, the court concluded that
the Clean Air Act occupied the field.' 05
Other claims based on pollution activities and federal common
law nuisance have received similar treatment by the federal courts. 106
Thus, the trend in federal court appears to strongly favor the preemp-
tion of federal common law nuisance-even when the federal statute
held to preempt common law does not address the particular fact situa-
98. 451 U.S. at 310 (quoting Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 107).
99. Id at 319.
100. See supra note 84.
101. 619 F.2d 623, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that a state has a federal common law cause
of action in nuisance against an instate pollution source).
102. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1982). On remand the
court reversed that portion of its prior holding allowing a federal common law cause of action.
103. 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (Supp. V 1981).
105. 532 F. Supp. at 702.
106. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clanmners Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22
(1980) (federal common law of nuisance in area of water pollution entirely preempted by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(federal nuisance cause of action for recovering cleanup costs resulting from illegal waste dump-
ing preempted by RCRA and CERCLA); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J.
1981), aft'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (federal common law nuisance claims to remedy hazards
of chemical dumping at private landfills preempted by CERCLA and RCRA).
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tion or provide an appropriate remedy.10 7 Given this background, it is
useful to survey recent federal decisions to determine whether the need
for federal common law in the hazardous waste setting is actually
preempted. I°8
In United States v. Wade,"0 9 a civil action was brought by the gov-
ernment under section 7003 of the RCRA and section 106 of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) to impose liability upon six chemical companies for costs
incurred in the cleanup of their disposal sites. The court concluded
that past off-site generators were not proper defendants under the pro-
visions cited by the government and dismissed the complaint.l 0 The
court noted that while section 106 of CERCLA could not be used to
impose cleanup liability on past waste generators, section 107 of the
Act clearly included such generators among those who could be sued
for reimbursement of cleanup costs expended initially by the govern-
ment."' Speculating on the reason that section 107 was not utilized as a
basis for the government's suit, the court stated:
107. "Although a federal court may disagree with the regulatory approach taken by the
agency with responsibility. . . under the Act, such disagreement alone is no basis for the creation
of federal common law." Milwaukee H, 451 U.S. at 323. "The question is whether the field has
been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner." Id at 324.
108. In a lecture before the New York City Bar Association in January 1964, Judge Friendly
spoke of the function of federal common law.
The clarion yet careful pronouncement of Erie, 'There is no federal general common
law," [quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)] opened the way to what
we may call specialized federal common law....
So. : . the Supreme Court, in the years since Erie, has been forging a new centripe-
tal tool incalculably useful to our federal system. It has employed a variety of tech-
niques--spontaneous generation . . ., implication of a private federal cause of action
from a statute providing other sanctions, construing a jurisdictional grant as a command
to fashion federal law, and the normaljudicialflling of statutory interstices.
H. FRIENDLY, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, in BENCHMARKS 155, 178,
194-95 (1967) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has spoken of the interstitial function of
federal common law in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
The federal courts have no general common law .... But this is not to say that wher-
ever we have occasion to decide a federal question which cannot be answered from fed-
eral statutes alone we may not resort to all of the source materials of the common law, or
that when we have fashioned an answer it does not become a part of the federal non-
statutory or common law.
Id Under this approach, federal common law, as a needed tool for filling the gaps often found in
federal statutes, would be preempted by federal statutes in the area of hazardous wastes only if the
statutes provided a completely effective means of compensation to all for hazardous waste inju-
ries. "Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows
from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes ... I" d at 470.
109. 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
110. Id at 794.
111. Id at 793.
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The government does not. . . straightforwardly state the rea-
son it has chosen to proceed via section 106 of CERCLA. A
reason may be that the Superfund, as enacted, is inadequate
to address the enormous public health problem posed in our
country by abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites.
When describing the scope of the problem before the Joint
Committee which considered CERCLA, EPA Assistant Ad-
ministrator Thomas C. Jorling stated that approximately [one
to two thousand] of the 30-50,000 waste disposal sites in the
U.S. pose potential threats to public health or the local envi-
ronment. He estimated that 26-44 billion dollars would be
needed to clean up these potentially dangerous sites. . . .As
enacted, the Superfund was a compromise bill, closer to the
House version ($1.6 billion) and clearly inadequate to remedy
the problem as the EPA testimony described it. 12
In light of the funding limitations imposed upon the CERCLA legisla-
tion, it appears that even though Congress has "occupied the field" of
hazardous waste cleanup with this Act, there are still generators of
waste that may not be held liable for the costs of remedying their past
disposal practices since sufficient funds have not been allotted by the
Act to enable the government to initially finance the cleanup." 3 Ac-
cording to the Wade court, these same generators would also escape
liability under section 7003 of the RCRA. "[S]ection 7003 may not, in
any case, be used to confer liability on non-negligent past off-site gen-
erators of hazardous waste. . . . [T]here is nothing in the statutory
language or the legislative history that would authorize such a consid-
erable extension of liability." '114
In contrast with the Wade court, a Minnesota decision refused to
dismiss a suit against a past offender who spilled, leaked, and dis-
charged chemical wastes directly into the ground at a disposal site.115
The United States sued Reilly Tar under section 7003 of RCRA116 and
112. Id at 793-94 n.22 (citations omitted).
113. For a discussion of the history of CERCLA and the funding compromises involved in its
enactment, see Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compen-
sation and Liability ("Supejfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
114. Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 790. But cf Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1073 (section 7003 imposed
liability on a negligent former owner of a waste site since he had contributed to current seepage
into groundwater).
115. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Minn. 1982).
Reilly Tar operated a plant refining coal tar and treating wood products from 1917 to 1972, gener-
ating chemical wastes that were treated, stored, and disposed of at the Reilly Tar site. The chemi-
cals that were discharged into the soil then migrated into the groundwater, part of the system of
aquifers supplying water to the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Id
116. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
19831
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sections 106 and 107 of CERCLA. 117 In refusing to dismiss the com-
plaints, the court stated that section 7003 and section 106, the imminent
hazards provisions of the two acts, were applicable in hazardous waste
suits despite the absence of interstate pollution.""8 The court further
found that the defendant's prior sale of the property did not relieve it of
accountability under the statute, 1 9 and that the situation at the waste
site met the "imminent and substantial endangerment" requirements of
the provisions. 2 ° The court held that the United States could also base
a claim for recovery of response costs on section 107 of CERCLA
because,
Under section 107(f) Reilly Tar may escape liability for
natural resource damages only where both the damages and
the release occurred wholly before December 11, 1980 ...
Section 107(f) precludes liability under section 107(a)(4)(C)
only where (1) all releases ended before December 11, 1980,
and (2) no damages were suffered on or after December 11,
1980, as a result of the release.' 21
Given such statements, the conclusion that a federal common law
of nuisance no longer presents a viable option to the environmental
litigant seems inescapable at the present time. 22 Since the decision in
Milwaukee II, federal courts have consistently dismissed pollution
claims based on federal common law.' 23 Apparently the courts believe
that the federal statutes regulating hazardous waste disposal remedies
have preempted all other potential methods of enforcement. If those
environmental statutes continue to be interpreted broadly, then there
likely will be little need for the federal courts to again recognize the
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-9607 (Supp. V 1981).
118. Reill' Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1113.
119. Id
120. Id at 1114. "[W]hile the risk of harm must be 'imminent'... the harm itself need not
be." Id at 1109-10. "Substantial" endangerment includes:
(1) a substantial likelihood that contaminants capable of causing adverse health effects
will be ingested by consumers if preventive action is not taken; (2) a substantial statistical
probability that disease will result from the presence of contaminants in drinking water,
or (3) the threat of substantial or serious harm (such as exposure to carcinogenic agents
or other hazardous contaminants).
Id at 1110 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6454, 6488).
121. 546 F. Supp. at 1120 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). December 11, 1980, was the
date Congress officially enacted CERCLA, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. V 1981).
122. However, all the cases cited were suits brought by governmental entities, as was Mil'au.
kee 11. In the absence of statutes that provide a private cause of action, the question of whether
federal common law may still govern in actions brought by private individuals to abate or com-
pensate for interstate pollution remains unanswered.
123. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18: 48
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federal common law nuisance action as a viable method of alleviating
pollution caused by solid and hazardous wastes.
III. THE FUTURE ROLE FOR COMMON LAW
Assuming that federal common law nuisance is preempted by stat-
utory enactments and recognizing that all the tort causes of action have
problems of adaptability in the environmental setting, the question
then becomes: What role, if any, can common law play in protecting
people and natural resources against hazardous waste pollution? The
answer appears to encompass three important aspects of the environ-
mental lawsuit: the state or local action, the personal injury lawsuit,
and the application of a strict liability standard to handlers of hazard-
ous wastes.
A. State and Local Actions
One primary application of common law is in state, local, or pri-
vate actions against polluters. Chappell,'24 Stepan,125 and Rollins126
represent cases where a court based its decision on a common law tort
theory. Moreover, recent cases support the proposition that the com-
mon law may provide a viable cause of action for those claims falling
outside the federal statutory scheme.
In Scott v. City of Hammond,'27 private individuals and the State
of Illinois brought suit in federal court against the City of Hammond,
Indiana, and its sanitary district alleging that untreated and inade-
quately treated sewage polluted Chicago beaches. 128 The court found
that federal jurisdiction was based on diversity, not on a federal ques-
tion,'29 that Illinois' choice of law rules applied, 30 and that plaintiffs
were entitled to seek relief under state law claims,131 including common
124. 540 F. Supp. 1087; see supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.125. 544 F. Supp. 1135; see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
126. 514 F. Supp. 936; see supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
127. 519 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. III. 1981).
128. Id at 293.
129. Id at 297. Explaining its rationale, the court said:
[T2he issue of regulating and preventing water pollution does not present the same type
of unresolvable conflict of state interests that the apportionment of boundaries and water
rights does .... In the water pollution control field.. the issue is not dividing the pie
but determining which standards will regulate discharges and provide remeides for inju-
ries. ... [W/here one or the other set of rules must be recognized as controllingj.
the benefits of stronger controls would redound to all states involved.
d
130. Id at 298.
131. Id at 297.
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law. Addressing the question of statutory preemption of common law,
the court said,
There can be no doubt that the [Federal Water Pollution
Control Act] does not preempt states from enforcing stricter
controls than the Federal government on in-state pol-
luters. . . Additionally, there is nothing in the Act nor its
legislative history that indicates a different result should be
reached when considering an out-of-state polluter.132
The court thus dismissed the federal common law counts and permitted
the causes of action based upon state common and statutory law of
nuisance, state common law of trespass, and state statutory environ-
mental law.133
Wood v. Picillo 134 is a state decision of great significance in the
hazardous waste area. In Wood, the Rhode Island Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment that the defendants had created both a
public and private nuisance by maintaining a hazardous waste dump
on their farm property.1 35 Describing the situation at the dumpsite, the
court indicated the seriousness of the offense.
The dump site proper might best be described in the suc-
cinct expression of the trial justice as "a chemical nightmare."
A viscous layer of pungent, varicolored liquid covered
the trench bottom to a depth of six inches at its shallowest
point. . . . An official from the state fire marshal's office...
testified that. . . he observed a truck marked "Combustible"
offloading barrels of chemical wastes. The truck operator
knocked the barrels off the truck's tailgate directly onto the
earth below, and chemicals poured freely from the damaged
barrels into the trench. 136
The trial judge found that the chemicals presented a current danger to
public health and safety which would worsen without immediate reme-
dial action.' 37 He therefore permanently enjoined the disposal opera-
tions and authorized plaintiffs to clean up the property at the
defendants' expense. 38 This type of forceful action, grounded in the
common law, is essential in confronting the current waste problem.
Thus, it may be concluded that state common law theories still
132. Id at 298.
133. Id at 293, 298.
134. 443 A.2d 1244 (R.L 1982).
135. Id at 1245.
136. Id at 1246.
137. Id at 1247.
138. Id
[Vol. 18:448
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have a vital role to play in cleaning up hazardous sites and enjoining
hazardous dumping practices and hazardous chemical emissions from
plants. As long as the claim is not based on a federal question or fed-
eral statute, the courts have not held that common law claims are
preempted.
B. Personal Injury Actions
One very important area in which common law may be the only
tool currently available is that of compensation to private individuals
for personal injury.13 9 CWhen Congress began consideration of a
superfund to compensate victims of hazardous waste, the proposed leg-
islation included provisions for compensation for personal injury; how-
ever, CERCLA, the compromise bill of 1980, eliminated any liability
for personal injury or private property 1OSS3.'4 In commenting on this
deletion, Senator Mitchell told the Senate that,
Under this bill, if a toxic waste discharge injures both a
tree and a person, the tree's owner, if it is a government, can
promptly recover from the fund for the cost of repairing the
damage, but the person cannot. In effect, at least as to the
superfund, it's all right to kill people, but not trees.1
4 1
The federal interest in controlling pollution of natural resources does
not encompass a federal interest in a private damage action. Therefore,
such actions should properly remain within the province of the state
and the common law.'
4 2
C. Establishment of a Strict Liability Industry Standard
The common law imposes a strict liability standard upon conduct
in certain situations:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is
subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of
another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised
the utmost care to prevent the harm.
139. [Bly restricting the primary coverage of [CERCLA] to governmental cleanup, re-
source restoration, and pollution response costs, Congress has indicated its reluctance to
modify legal principles traditionally relegated to state control. Thus, private citizens in-jured by toxic substances generally must continue to litigate such claims in state court
according to the common law and other legal rules applied in that particular jurisdiction.
Superfund at Square One, supra note 41, at 10,106 (footnote omitted).
140. Grad, supra note 113, at 19; Comment, supra note 66, at 701.
141. 126 CONG. REC. S14,973 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
142. See generally Note, supra note 83, at 519-24 (damage actions do not stop pollution, which
is the federal legislative goal, so such actions are best left to state courts).
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(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the
possibility of which makes the activity abnormally
dangerous. 143
In explaining the applicability of a strict liability standard, Prosser'"
indicated that strict liability attaches to,
conduct which has so much social utility that it will not be
treated as tortious or blameworthy in itself, and the defendant
will not be prohibited from carrying it on, but not so much
that he will be allowed to carry it on without liability for ac-
tual resulting damage, at the expense of his neighbors. 1 4
(It is apparent that the transporting and disposing of toxic wastes is
necessary. Yet there can be little doubt that the handling of toxic
wastes meets almost all recognized criteria for considering the activity
abnormally dangerous. 146 Therefore, courts must consider, and indeed
already are, applying common law strict liability to the hazardous
waste industry.' 4 j
The Superior Court of New Jersey, in Ciy of Bridgeton v. B.P'. Oil,
Inc. ,148 held that the possessor of a hazardous pollutant who stores it
on his property is strictly liable for damages if it spreads or "escapes"
onto surrounding property.149 In a recent Fifth Circuit decision, Ash-
land Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co. , '0 the court cited with ap-
proval section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts'' in holding
that a chemical waste company was strictly liable for damages resulting
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976).
144. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399 (1942).
145. Id at 404 (footnote omitted).
146. In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976).
147. For a discussion of the applicability of the strict liability cause of action, see Note, Strict
Liabilityfor Generators, Transporters, and Disposers ofHazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949
(1980); Note, The Development of a Strict Liability Cause of Action for Personal Injuries Resulting
from Hazardous Waste, 16 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 543 (1981).
148. 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976).
149. Id at -, 369 A.2d at 54. "The policy of the law in this State and of society in general
makes this a case of strict liability rather than of negligence." Id
150. 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982).
151. Id at 1307-08.
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from the intentional injection of hazardous chemical waste products
into a crude oil pipeline.1 52  "Applying the factors articulated. . . in
§ 520 of the Restatement, Second, to the conduct of [defendants], the
Court is constrained to hold that the disposal of the [hazardous chemi-
cal byproducts] by these defendants was an abnormally dangerous and
ultrahazardous activity."'153
Che application of strict liability standards to the hazardous waste
industry clearly presents another important role for the common law.
Although this approach would be applicable only to those openly in-
volved in the industry,1 54 it nevertheless would be a very effective tool
for judicial enforcement of responsible industry standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
The day may come when the field of hazardous waste disposal reg-
ulation will be entirely and effectively consumed by statutory law.
Both the federal government and the states appear to be moving gener-
ally in that direction. Because of the complexity of the issues and the
technology involved with chemical wastes, it is likely that the federal
government will be the only governmental entity with the resources
necessary to truly implement effective regulatory programs. Nonethe-
less, even for the federal government, a genuinely effective comprehen-
sive program may be many years away. In the meantime, the need for
common law actions remains.
Regulatory agencies are sometimes thought to represent primarily
the interests of those they were created to regulate.15 5 Thus, the pub-
lic's faith in their effectiveness can falter. Generally, agencies lack suf-
ficient staffing and funding to handle all the problems currently arising
from hazardous waste mismanagement. Moreover, state environmen-
152. Id at 1308. The court further found the company liable under an intentional tort theory,
even though plaintiff omitted that cause of action from its theory of the case. Id at 1309.
153. Id at 1308.
154. Only those storage or disposal activities ostensibly operating under appropriate govern-
mental guidelines would be considered the type of activities with social utility to which strict
liability would apply. "If the utility of the activity does not justify the risk it creates, it may be
negligence merely to carry it on, and the rule stated in this Section is not then necessary to subject
the defendant to liability for harm resulting from it:' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520
comment b (1976). Covert disposal operations, therefore, would more appropriately be punish-
able under other tort actions, criminal codes, or state waste disposal statutes.
155. "The tendency of administrative agencies to become the captives of those they ostensibly
regulate has long been noticed and has had a deleterious effect on the legitimacy of the adminis-
trative process by calling into question its independence and integrity." J. FREEDMAN, CEaSIS
AND LEGmTMACY 35 (1978). "[L]ong-term dealing with the problems of an industry inevitably
leads to a greater sympathy and understanding for the industry's attitudes.. . " Id at 58.
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tal statutory schemes are still in the formative stages and remain inade-
quate to handle the problems. The private citizen, therefore, is left
without recourse for his injuries unless he has access to the courts under
common law theories. Clearly, then, until federal and state regulatory
agencies can govern the hazardous waste field under statutory schemes
that are sufficiently broad in scope and sufficiently funded to be effec-
tive, the need for the common law cause of action will endure.
Judy A. Johnson
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